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Implementation Rules For Fiscal Decentralization

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Abstract

Rule #1 Fiscal decentralization should be viewed as a comprehensive system.Rule #2 Finance follows function.Rule #3There must be a strong central ability to monitor and evaluate decentralization.Rule #4 One intergovernmental system does not fit the urban and the rural sector. Rule #5 Fiscal decentralization requires significant local government taxing powers.Rule #6 Central governments must keep the fiscal decentralization rules that they make .Rule #7 Keep it simple. Rule #8 The design of the intergovernmental transfer system should match the objectives of the decentralization reform .Rule #9 Fiscal decentralization should consider all three levels of government. Rule #10 Impose a hard budget constraint. Rule #11 Recognize that intergovernmental systems are always in transition and plan for this. Rule #12 There must be a champion for fiscal decentralization .

Suggested Citation

  • Roy Bahl, 1999. "Implementation Rules For Fiscal Decentralization," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9803, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper9803
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    1. Richard Bird & Pierre Gendron, 1998. "Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(3), pages 429-442, July.
    2. Dillinger, William, 1991. "Urban property tax reform : guidelines and recommendations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 710, The World Bank.
    3. Prud'homme, Remy, 1995. "The Dangers of Decentralization," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 10(2), pages 201-220, August.
    4. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Robert McNab, 1997. "Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth, and Democratic Governance," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9707, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    5. Bahl, Roy W. & Wallich, Christine, 1992. "Intergovernmental fiscal relations in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 863, The World Bank.
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