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Family Taxation: An Unfair and Inefficient System

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  • Patricia Apps

    (University of Sydney, RSSS - ANU)

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the 2005-06 family tax system comprising the personal income tax, the Medicare Levy, Family Tax Benefits Parts A and B and tax offsets. The results show that most families are now taxed, in effect, on the basis of joint income. Through a succession of reforms the Howard Government has shifted the tax burden to two-earner families to such an extent that many now pay close to the same amount of tax as a family in which only one parent need work to earn the same income while the other works full time at home. This is a defining feature of joint taxation. The study also finds that families face a marginal rate schedule that is no longer progressive but tends to have an inverted U-shaped profile – working families in the middle of the distribution face the highest marginal rates. As a consequence, the incomes of second earners in low and average wage families are taxed effectively at the highest average rates in the economy. The study explains why the system is unfair and seriously damaging for the economy in its effects on female labour supply in an ageing population. On the basis of the results, the paper argues for a return to a progressive individual income tax system, to improve support for families and to raise female participation and productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Apps, 2006. "Family Taxation: An Unfair and Inefficient System," CEPR Discussion Papers 524, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    • Handle: RePEc:auu:dpaper:524
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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/CEPR/DP524.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patricia Apps, 2002. "Why an Earned income tax credit program is a mistake for Australia," Australian Journal of Labour Economics (AJLE), Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School, vol. 5(4), pages 549-568, December.
    2. Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983. "Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April.
    3. Florence Jaumotte, 2003. "Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main Determinants in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 376, OECD Publishing.
    4. Martin Feldstein & Daniel R. Feenberg, 1996. "The Taxation of Two-Earner Families," NBER Chapters, in: Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation, pages 39-75, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 1999. "On the taxation of trade within and between households," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 241-263, August.
    6. Apps, Patricia, 1991. "Tax Reform, Population Ageing and the Changing Labour Supply Behaviour of Married Women," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 4(3), pages 201-216, August.
    7. Patricia F. Apps & Ray Rees, 1999. "Individual versus Joint Taxation in Models with Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(2), pages 393-403, April.
    8. Shelly J. Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(3), pages 463-480.
    9. Kathryn Shaw, 1994. "The Persistence of Female Labor Supply: Empirical Evidence and Implications," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(2), pages 348-378.
    10. Martin Feldstein & James M. Poterba, 1996. "Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld96-1, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Bloemen & Elena Stancanelli, 2007. "Modelling the employment and wage outcomes of spouses: is she outearning him?," Post-Print hal-01053593, HAL.
    2. Meg Smith & Kathy Tannous, 2013. "Access to Full-Time Employment - Does Gender Matter?," Australian Journal of Labour Economics (AJLE), Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School, vol. 16(2), pages 237-257.
    3. Hayes, Phillip & Redmond, Gerry, 2014. "Could a universal family payment improve gender equity and reduce child poverty in Australia? A microsimulation analysis," EUROMOD Working Papers EM3/14, EUROMOD at the Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    4. Elena Stancanelli, 2007. "Marriage and Work: an analysis for French couples in the last decade," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-10, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    5. Ann Harding & Quoc Ngu Vu & Alicia Payne & Richard Percival, 2009. "Trends in Effective Marginal Tax Rates in Australia from 1996–97 to 2006–07," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 85(271), pages 449-461, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income taxation; labour supply; household;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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