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Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots

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  • Federico Fioravanti
  • Zoi Terzopoulou

Abstract

When voters evaluate alternatives sequentially, an anchoring bias makes their ballots depend on the order in which alternatives are presented. For approval ballots, no non-constant voting rule is robust to this dependence. We show that ranked ballots change the picture sharply: a rank-based rule is robust to the presentation order if and only if it is tops-only. Robustness to anchoring is thus available, but only at the price of ignoring everything a voter reports beyond her favourite alternative.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Fioravanti & Zoi Terzopoulou, 2026. "Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots," Papers 2610.10316, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2610.10316
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2012. "A characterization of the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 330-332.
    2. Yohei Sekiguchi, 2012. "A Characterization of the Plurality Rule," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-833, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Jonas Radbruch & Amelie Schiprowski, 2025. "Interview Sequences and the Formation of Subjective Assessments," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(2), pages 1226-1256.
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