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Report NEP-DES-2026-10-19
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Andreas Kleiner, 2026, "Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2025_784, Sep.
- Lijian Lu & Ce Zhang, 2026, "Payment Design under Belief Disagreement: Rent Placement, Bid Resolution, and Auction Choice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.05650, Oct.
- Joshua S. Gans, 2026, "Soft Reserves, Learning and Bid Adjustment in Advertising Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35841, Oct.
- Guoqiang Tian, 2026, "Dynamic Mechanism and Information Design in AI-Agent Environments: A General Analytical Framework," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.11177, Oct, revised Oct 2026.
- Yuta Nakamura & Noriaki Okamoto, 2026, "Protecting Losers Undermines Auction Credibility," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.12204, Oct.
- Bettina Klaus & Yang Chen & Anh Tri^eu, 2026, "Serial Top Trading Cycles and the Exclusion Core in Mixed-Ownership Object Allocation Problems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.04015, Oct.
- Varun Bansal & Sinan Ertemel & Rajnish Kumar & Anh Pham, 2026, "Selective Verification in Centralized Admissions: Which Priority Claims Must Be Checked?," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.10131, Oct.
- Dihan Zou, 2026, "Regulating a Monopolist through Capacity Control," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.07189, Oct, revised Oct 2026.
- Endre Cs'oka & M'at'e Viczi'an, 2026, "Risk-minimizing GUE-implementations of truthful reporting in a Dynamic Social Choice Problem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.10456, Oct.
- Federico Fioravanti & Zoi Terzopoulou, 2026, "Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.10316, Oct.
- Bhavook Bhardwaj & Marco LiCalzi, 2026, "Choice via Ownership Rules," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.06428, Oct.
- Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2026, "Dictatorial profiles: a proof of Arrow's theorem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.11851, Oct.
- Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout & Yun Wang, 2026, "Auctioning the Right to Trust and Reciprocate: Scarcity, Market Allocation, and Selection in the Trust Game," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 26-12.
- Francis Annan & Collin B. Raymond, 2026, "Beliefs Over Contracts," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35788, Oct.
- Benjamin Marsh, 2026, "Coexistence of Shill-Proof and Non-Shill-Proof Equilibria in a Public Auction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.06262, Oct.
- Pranay Anchuri & Edward W. Felten & Akaki Mamageishvili, 2026, "Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.03922, Oct.
- Ujjwal Kumar, 2026, "Identifiable Preference Types and Optimal Menu-Choice Experiments," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.10207, Oct.
- Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Edward Plumb & Clemens Possnig & Yufei Zhang, 2026, "Delegate Pricing to Algorithms: When Slow and Steady Wins the Race," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.11675, Oct, revised Oct 2026.
- David Argente, 2026, "Welfare Analysis with Complementarities: When Direct and Total Responses Are Sufficient," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35843, Oct.