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The Attention Cost of Stable Matching

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  • Victor H. Aguiar
  • Dian Hong

Abstract

In large markets, scarce attention limits partner evaluation and creates allocation loss, which stability magnifies. In an independent random market with average executable degree $d$, unmatched shares fall at rates $e^{-\sqrt d}$ under stability and $e^{-d}$ under maximum matching on the same graph. Changing consideration can make applications rejected in a provisional active-screen computation relevant again. Exact query-neutral implementation must retain allocation-relevant off-screen authorizations; otherwise, missing authorization must be reacquired. Limited-attention deferred acceptance (LA-DA) preserves valid authorizations and reengages eligible pairs. Conditional on exact next-best information and persistent execution rights, adaptive discovery saves a logarithmic factor in reached proposals relative to independent exposure. In an application to speed dating, bilateral reports let us compare stable and maximum matching on restricted graphs, separating missed opportunities from same-graph stability loss. In Chilean school choice, we document 9,502 applicants accepting higher-ranked or new placements through retained rankings.

Suggested Citation

  • Victor H. Aguiar & Dian Hong, 2026. "The Attention Cost of Stable Matching," Papers 2609.09693, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.09693
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