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A Note on Market Segmentation and Bertrand Competition

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  • Zhang Xu
  • Mingsheng Zhang
  • Wei Zhao

Abstract

In this note, we show that equilibrium profit is zero in Bertrand competition with a finite number of firms and consumers whose willingness to pay are bounded, under any market segmentation profile.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang Xu & Mingsheng Zhang & Wei Zhao, 2026. "A Note on Market Segmentation and Bertrand Competition," Papers 2608.07918, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.07918
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Rhodes & Jidong Zhou, 2024. "Personalized Pricing and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(7), pages 2141-2170, July.
    2. Baye, Michael R. & Morgan, John, 1999. "A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 59-65, October.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
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