Author
Abstract
Organizations increasingly pursue multiple objectives, yet we know little about how boundedly rational firms search for better strategies when performance is multidimensional. We use corporate social responsibility (CSR) -- pursuing social and financial outcomes simultaneously -- as a motivating context. We distinguish multi-objective decision making (choosing among known alternatives) from multi-objective search (discovering alternatives through path-dependent local moves), and argue that preferences matter through the heuristics that implement them during search. In a dual-landscape NK simulation, we compare five prominent heuristics: Maximize (improve financial performance only), Combine (raise the sum of financial and social performance), Alternate (pursue one goal until stuck, then switch), Penalize (maximize financial performance while deducting shortfalls below a social threshold), and Satisfice (prioritize financial performance only after meeting a social threshold). Across varying complexity, goal correlation, and thresholds, these heuristics produce systematically different trajectories and joint outcomes. Importantly, by escaping local financial optima, Alternate often discovers "oblique" strategies that match or exceed the financial performance achieved by profit-only local search while also improving social performance. We conclude that implementing the same multi-goal preferences through different search heuristics steers firms toward different regions of the social-financial frontier, shaping both the compromises they reach and the opportunities they discover.
Suggested Citation
D. Albert & F. A Csaszar, 2026.
"Search Heuristics Under Multiple Objectives: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility,"
Papers
2606.15545, arXiv.org.
Handle:
RePEc:arx:papers:2606.15545
Download full text from publisher
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2606.15545. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.