Being Efficiently Fickle: a Dynamic Theory of Organizational Choice
A central proposition in organization theory is that discrete organizational forms are matched in a discriminating way to environmental conditions, business strategies, or exchange rate conditions. This paper develops a contrary theoretical proposition. We argue that efficiency may dictate modulating between discrete governance modes in response to a stable set of exchange conditions.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899.|
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/
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