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Ideology, institutions, and economic growth: panel evidence 1995 2022

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  • Eduardo Koffmann Jopia
  • Patricia Galilea Aranda

Abstract

Does it matter whether a government is "left wing" or "right wing" for economic growth? Using a panel of 113 countries (1995 2022), we combine: (i) the economic ideology of the executive branch (V Dem), (ii) the disaggregated institutional quality of the economic freedom index (Heritage), separating a core institutional block (HN: property rights, government integrity, judicial effectiveness) from a block of liberalization policies (HL: trade/financial openness, regulatory efficiency, size of government), and (iii) economic performance (GDP per capita PPP and its growth, World Bank). We estimate panel models with fixed effects by country and year, and standard errors grouped by country. We find that HN is strongly associated with higher income levels, while HL, on average globally, is not significant for income level once HN is controlled for, nor does it consistently predict short term growth. Government ideology exhibits weak direct effects on growth, although it operates indirectly via HL (right wing governments tend to have higher HL scores). Robustness tests with long five-year differences and country specific trends reinforce that, in the long run, "institutions prevail over politics." We conclude with recommendations for developing countries: prioritize the institutional core (rule of law, anti-corruption, effective justice) as a basis for policies whether left-wing or right wing to bear fruit in terms of growth

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  • Eduardo Koffmann Jopia & Patricia Galilea Aranda, 2025. "Ideology, institutions, and economic growth: panel evidence 1995 2022," Papers 2509.04532, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2509.04532
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    References listed on IDEAS

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