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A Unified Theory of School Choice

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  • Peter Doe

Abstract

In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district's objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools. However, because priorities are the amalgamation of multiple policy goals, some may be more flexible than others. This paper introduces a model that distinguishes between two types of priority: a between-group priority that ranks groups of students and must be respected, and a within-group priority for efficiently allocating seats within each group. The solution I introduce, the unified core, integrates both types. I provide a two-stage algorithm, the DA-TTC, that implements the unified core and generalizes both the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. This approach provides a method for improving efficiency in school choice while honoring policymakers' objectives.

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  • Peter Doe, 2025. "A Unified Theory of School Choice," Papers 2504.09357, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2504.09357
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dur, Umut & Paiement, Scott, 2024. "A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 93-100.
    2. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
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