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Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance

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  • Patrick Allmis

Abstract

Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their neighborhood, their tolerance, and invest into connections. The resulting weighted network describes allies, opponents, and strengths. Disputes with opponents determine benefits, which increase in an agent's strength and cohesion. Cohesive agents have fewer mutual allies with opponents. In equilibrium, the network is segregated when cohesion is effective enough and some agents tolerate ideologically distant types to oppose closer ones. Subsidizing connections dampens polarization in societies on the verge of segregation.

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  • Patrick Allmis, 2024. "Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance," Papers 2407.14045, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2407.14045
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