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Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle

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  • Siyang Xiong

Abstract

Traditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g., Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious dominance). First, if a solution concept is additive, implementation in sequential-move games is equivalent to implementation in simultaneous-move games. Second, for any solution concept \r{ho} and any social choice function f, we identify a canonical operator {\gamma}^{(\r{ho},f)}, which is defined on primitives. We prove that, if \r{ho} is monotonic, f can be implemented by a sequential-move game if and only if {\gamma}^{(\r{ho},f)} is achievable, which translates a complicated mechanism design problem into checking some conditions defined on primitives. Most of the existing solution concepts are either additive or monotonic.

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  • Siyang Xiong, 2024. "Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle," Papers 2402.13580, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.13580
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
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