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Pandora's Ballot Box: Electoral Politics of Direct Democracy

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  • Peter Buisseret
  • Richard Van Weelden

Abstract

We study how office-seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that divide its core supporters. When referendums do not bind, however, an electorally disadvantaged party may initiate a referendum to elevate new issues in order to divide the supporters of its stronger opponent. We identify conditions under which direct democracy improves congruence between policy outcomes and voter preferences, but also show that it can lead to greater misalignment both on issues subject to direct democracy and those that are not.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Buisseret & Richard Van Weelden, 2022. "Pandora's Ballot Box: Electoral Politics of Direct Democracy," Papers 2208.05535, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2208.05535
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Carlo Prato & Bruno Strulovici, 2017. "The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 440-466, July.
    5. Matsusaka, John G & McCarty, Nolan M, 2001. "Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 413-448, October.
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