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A Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation

Author

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  • Jian Low
  • Chen Hajaj
  • Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Abstract

We present a rotating proposer mechanism for team formation, which implements a Pareto efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form team formation game.

Suggested Citation

  • Jian Low & Chen Hajaj & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, 2022. "A Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation," Papers 2204.04251, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2204.04251
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.04251
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. ,, 2015. "Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
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    Cited by:

    1. Greg Leo & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2023. "Subgame Perfect Coalition Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 510-524, June.

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