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On the value of non-Markovian Dynkin games with partial and asymmetric information

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  • Tiziano De Angelis
  • Nikita Merkulov
  • Jan Palczewski

Abstract

We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of our method of proof we also obtain existence of optimal strategies for both players. The main novelties are that we do not assume a Markovian nature of the game nor a particular structure of the information available to the players. This allows us to go beyond the variational methods (based on PDEs) developed in the literature on Dynkin games in continuous time with partial/asymmetric information. Instead, we focus on a probabilistic and functional analytic approach based on the general theory of stochastic processes and Sion's min-max theorem (M. Sion, Pacific J. Math., 8, 1958, pp. 171-176). Our framework encompasses examples found in the literature on continuous time Dynkin games with asymmetric information and we provide counterexamples to show that our assumptions cannot be further relaxed.

Suggested Citation

  • Tiziano De Angelis & Nikita Merkulov & Jan Palczewski, 2020. "On the value of non-Markovian Dynkin games with partial and asymmetric information," Papers 2007.10643, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2007.10643
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tiziano De Angelis & Fabien Gensbittel & St'ephane Villeneuve, 2017. "A Dynkin game on assets with incomplete information on the return," Papers 1705.07352, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
    2. Touzi, N. & Vieille, N., 1999. "Continuous-Time Dynkin Games with Mixed Strategies," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 1999.112, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    3. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1999. "Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies," Discussion Papers 1258, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Riedel, Frank & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2017. "Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 36-50.
    5. Andreas Kyprianou, 2004. "Some calculations for Israeli options," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 73-86, January.
    6. Marta Leniec & Kristoffer Glover & Erik Ekström, 2017. "Dynkin games with heterogeneous beliefs," Published Paper Series 2017-2, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    7. Fabien Gensbittel & Christine Grün, 2019. "Zero-Sum Stopping Games with Asymmetric Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 277-302, February.
    8. Tiziano De Angelis & Erik Ekstrom & Kristoffer Glover, 2018. "Dynkin games with incomplete and asymmetric information," Papers 1810.07674, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
    9. Erik Ekstrom & Stephane Villeneuve, 2006. "On the value of optimal stopping games," Papers math/0610324, arXiv.org.
    10. Stéphane Villeneuve & Erik Ekstrom, 2006. "On the Value of Optimal Stopping Games," Post-Print hal-00173182, HAL.
    11. Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan, 2002. "Stopping Games in Continuous Time," Discussion Papers 1354, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6927 is not listed on IDEAS
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