A note on competitive toughness: why it should be identified neither with product substitutability, nor (inversely) with concentration. Toward a unified theory of oligopoly
Often the intensity of competition has been measured through proxies like the degree of product substitutability or as the inverse of the degree of concentration in an industry. Both visions are based on the implicit assumption that few competitors imply a less though competition, but puzzles arise as several counter-examples exist. Other puzzling issues arise from the lack of a unified approach to oligopolistic equilibria (e.g. Cournot vs Bertrand competition). In this paper the unified approach of competitive toughness proposed by D'Aspremont et al.(2007), offering a generalization of the traditional oligopoly theory encompassing all the possible oligopolistic regimes between the Cournot and the competitive outcome, is discussed, also with respect to its implication for economic growth and macro studies.
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- D’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2007. "Imperfect competition and the trade cycle: guidelines from the late thirties," CORE Discussion Papers 2007079, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2010.
"Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 21-33, September.
- Claude, D’ASPREMONT & Rodolphe, DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, 2005. "Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- D’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2005. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," CORE Discussion Papers 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, . "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2238, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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