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Trade Flows and Trade Disputes

Author

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  • Kara M. Reynolds
  • Chad P. Bown

Abstract

This paper introduces a new data set and establishes a set of basic facts and patterns regarding the 'trade' that countries fight about under WTO dispute settlement. It characterizes the scope of products, as well as the levels of and changes to the trade values, market shares, volumes, and prices for those goods that eventually become subject to WTO litigation. The first result is striking heterogeneity in the level of market access at stake across disputes: e.g., 14 percent of cases over disputed import products feature bilateral trade that is less than $1 million per year, and another 15 percent feature bilateral trade that is more than $1 billion per year. Nevertheless, some strong patterns emerge from a more detailed examination of the data. Both high- and low-income complainants tend to suffer important losses in foreign market access in the products that ultimately become subject to dispute. Furthermore, while the respondent's imposition of an allegedly WTO-inconsistent policy is associated with reductions, on average, to trade values, volumes and exporter-received prices, there is some evidence of differences in the size of these changes across both the different types of policies under dispute and the potential exporter country litigants. Finally, these different types of policies under dispute can have dissimilar trade effects for the complainant relative to other (non-complainant) exporters of the disputed product, and this is likely to affect the litigation allegiance of third countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Kara M. Reynolds & Chad P. Bown, 2014. "Trade Flows and Trade Disputes," Working Papers 2014-05, American University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:amu:wpaper:2014-05
    DOI: 10.17606/gywv-xp53
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Serrano Caballero, Enriqueta & Ojo, Marianne, 2019. "Trade Negotiations and Global Relations: Emerging Players and Actors," MPRA Paper 92105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Timothy Meyer, 2017. "Explaining energy disputes at the World Trade Organization," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 391-410, June.
    3. Neha Bhardwaj Upadhayay, 2020. "Uncovering the proliferation of contingent protection through channels of retaliation, gender and development assistance," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph20-02 edited by Julie Lochard & Catherine Bros, December.
    4. Chad Bown & Kara Reynolds, 2015. "Trade flows and trade disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 145-177, June.
    5. Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik & Van Damme, Isabelle, 2020. "Expired measures, excess duty drawbacks and causation: The Appellate Body report in EU - PET (Pakistan)," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-665, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    6. Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan & Isabelle Van Damme, 2019. "Expired measures, excess duty drawbacks and causation: The Appellate Body report in EU – PET (Pakistan)," RSCAS Working Papers 2019/81, European University Institute.

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