Trade Flows and Trade Disputes
This paper introduces a new data set and establishes a set of basic facts and patterns regarding the 'trade' that countries fight about under WTO dispute settlement. It characterizes the scope of products, as well as the levels of and changes to the trade values, market shares, volumes, and prices for those goods that eventually become subject to WTO litigation. The first result is striking heterogeneity in the level of market access at stake across disputes: e.g., 14 percent of cases over disputed import products feature bilateral trade that is less than $1 million per year, and another 15 percent feature bilateral trade that is more than $1 billion per year. Nevertheless, some strong patterns emerge from a more detailed examination of the data. Both high- and low-income complainants tend to suffer important losses in foreign market access in the products that ultimately become subject to dispute. Furthermore, while the respondent's imposition of an allegedly WTO-inconsistent policy is associated with reductions, on average, to trade values, volumes and exporter-received prices, there is some evidence of differences in the size of these changes across both the different types of policies under dispute and the potential exporter country litigants. Finally, these different types of policies under dispute can have dissimilar trade effects for the complainant relative to other (non-complainant) exporters of the disputed product, and this is likely to affect the litigation allegiance of third countries.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Beshkar, Mostafa, 2010. "Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 35-48, September.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Stephen E. Haynes, 2010. "Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1283-84, June.
- Amit Khandelwal, 2007.
"The Long and Short (of) Quality Ladders,"
2007 Meeting Papers
244, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bown, Chad P. & McCulloch, Rachel, 2010.
"Developing countries, dispute settlement, and the advisory centre on WTO law,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
5168, The World Bank.
- Chad Bown & Rachel McCulloch, 2010. "Developing countries, dispute settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 33-63.
- Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, 2005. "WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 861-890, December.
- Beshkar, Mostafa, 2010. "Optimal remedies in international trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 455-466, April.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2011.
"What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1238-73, June.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2006. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," NBER Working Papers 12727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chad P. Bown, 2005.
"Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 515-555, 06.
- Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank.
- Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2001.
"Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 233-279, June.
- Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C, 2001. "Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favoured Nation Clause," CEPR Discussion Papers 2859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Brian D. Kelly, 2010. "Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1280-82, June.
- Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, 2013. "How Important can the Non-Violation Clause be for the GATT/WTO?," NBER Working Papers 19256, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chad P. Bown & Meredith A. Crowley, 2013.
"Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 1071-90, April.
- Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2010. "Self-enforcing trade agreements : evidence from time-varying trade policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5223, The World Bank.
- Bown, Chad P., 2004. "Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: an empirical assessment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 263-294, March.
- repec:oup:qjecon:v:128:y:2013:i:4:p:1837-1893 is not listed on IDEAS
- Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, 2005. "Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 557-598, 06.
- Kara M. Reynolds, 2007. "Why Are So Many WTO Disputes Abandoned?," Working Papers 2007-05, American University, Department of Economics.
- repec:oup:restud:v:78:y:2011:i:3:p:1102-1134 is not listed on IDEAS
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:amu:wpaper:2014-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Meal)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.