IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Preferential Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards: Stumbling Block Evidence from MERCOSUR

Listed author(s):
  • Patricia Tovar

    (Departamento de Economía de la PUCP del Perú)

  • Chad P. Bown

Aún no hay un consenso en la literatura sobre acuerdos comerciales con respecto a si la liberalización preferencial conlleva a más o a menos liberalización multilateral. Sin embargo, hasta ahora las investigaciones se han enfocado mayormente en medidas arancelarias de protección a las importaciones. En este estudio desarrollamos medidas de política comercial más completas que incluyen las políticas de barreras temporales al comercio (BTC) de antidumping y salvaguardias; estudios en otros contextos también han mostrado cómo estas políticas pueden erosionar parte de las ganancias de la liberalización comercial que surgen cuando se examinan sólo los aranceles. Examinamos las experiencias de Argentina y Brasil durante la formación del MERCOSUR en 1990-2001, y hallamos que un enfoque exclusivo en aranceles aplicados puede llevar a una caracterización equívoca de la relación entre liberalización preferencial y liberalización hacia países no miembros. Primeramente, cualquier evidencia de “building block” que surge al enfocarse en aranceles durante el periodo en el que MERCOSUR fue sólo un área de libre comercio puede desaparecer cuando también incluimos cambios en la protección a las importaciones que ocurren a través de BTC. Además, hay evidencia de un efecto de “stumbling block” de la liberalización comercial arancelaria para el periodo en el cual MEROCUSR se volvió una unión aduanera, y este resultado tiende a fortalecerse con la inclusión de BTC. Finalmente, también proveemos una primera evaluación empírica sobre si motivos de poder de mercado pueden ayudar a explicar los patrones de los cambios en la protección a las importaciones que se observan en estos escenarios.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://files.pucp.edu.pe/departamento/economia/DDD423.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú in its series Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers with number 2016-423.

as
in new window

Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 2016
Publication status: published
Handle: RePEc:pcp:pucwps:wp00423
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Av. Universitaria 1801, San Miguel, Lima, Perú

Phone: (511) 626-2000 ext. 4950, 4951
Fax: (511) 626-2874
Web page: http://departamento.pucp.edu.pe/economia/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Bohara, Alok K. & Gawande, Kishore & Sanguinetti, Pablo, 2004. "Trade diversion and declining tariffs: evidence from Mercosur," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 65-88, October.
  2. Ketterer, Tobias D. & Bernhofen, Daniel & Milner, Chris, 2014. "Preferences, rent destruction and multilateral liberalization: The building block effect of CUSFTA," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 63-77.
  3. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, July.
  4. Karacaovali, Baybars & Limão, Nuno, 2008. "The clash of liberalizations: Preferential vs. multilateral trade liberalization in the European Union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 299-327, March.
  5. Joseph Mai & Andrey Stoyanov, 2015. "The effect of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian multilateral trade liberalization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(3), pages 1067-1098, August.
  6. Chad P. Bown & Baybars Karacaovali & Patricia Tovar, 2014. "What Do We Know About Preferential Trade Agreements and Temporary Trade Barriers?," Working Papers 201418, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  7. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 5, pages 53-66 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  8. Thomas J. Prusa & Robert Teh, 2010. "Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes," NBER Working Papers 16276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Chad P. Bown, 2011. "Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–2009," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(12), pages 1955-1998, December.
  10. Pramila Crivelli, 2014. "Regionalism and Falling External Protection in High and Low Tariff Members," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 14082, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
  11. Richardson, Martin, 1993. "Endogenous protection and trade diversion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3-4), pages 309-324, May.
  12. Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1999. "Customs Unions and Comparative Advantage," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 239-266, April.
  13. Ketterer, Tobias D. & Bernhofen, Daniel M. & Milner, Chris, 2015. "The impact of trade preferences on multilateral tariff cuts: Evidence for Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 31-51.
  14. Limão, Nuno & Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 186-205.
  15. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2011. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1238-1273, June.
  16. Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, 2013. "Do terms-of-trade effects matter for trade agreements? Theory and evidence from WTO Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(4), pages 1837-1893.
  17. Tovar, Patricia, 2012. "Preferential Trade Agreements and Unilateral Liberalization: Evidence from CAFTA," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(04), pages 591-619, October.
  18. Nuno Limao, 2006. "Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 896-914, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcp:pucwps:wp00423. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.