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Carrots and Sticks: Targeting the Opposition in an Autocratic Regime

Author

Listed:
  • Cathrin Mohr

    (University of Bonn, Niebuhrstr. 5, 53113 Bonn, Germany)

Abstract

Autocratic regimes can use carrots and/or sticks to prevent being overthrown by protests. Carrots, i.e. resource allocation, reduce the probability of protests, but cannot help to end them. Sticks, i.e. repression, reduce the probability that protests overthrow the regime, but also decrease its popularity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that residential construction and military presence increase in protest municipalities after an uprising in 1953 in former East Germany. This cannot be explained by pre-existing differences, demand for housing, or external warfare considerations. Carrots were furthermore used to counteract sticks' negative effect on popularity. More construction is associated with more regime support.

Suggested Citation

  • Cathrin Mohr, 2023. "Carrots and Sticks: Targeting the Opposition in an Autocratic Regime," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 236, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:236
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_236_2023.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lorentzen, Peter L., 2013. "Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(2), pages 127-158, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy; autocracy; Protests;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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