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Mesures techniques, Choix Institutionnels et Equité dans l’usage d’une ressource commune : Le cas du littoral marseillais

  • Dominique Ami

    ()

    (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS)

  • Juliette Rouchier

    ()

    (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS)

Nous étudions la perception que certains acteurs du littoral marseillais ont de la gouvernance de la zone, ainsi que de leur logique d’action en mobilisant le cadre d’analyse néo institutionnaliste de l’IAD (Institution Analysis and Design). Pour cela, des entretiens semi directifs ont été menés. Plusieurs dimensions du discours des acteurs ont été recueillies : la définition que les acteurs ont du littoral et de ce qui leur parait important, leur perception des usages, des conflits et des nuisances, leur compréhension et représentation de la gouvernance locale et enfin leur appréciation de l’équité dans le fonctionnement du système. Le discours des acteurs est analysé au travers du prisme de l’IAD. Une première série de diagnostics de performance de ce qui apparaît comme l’institution centrale de la gouvernance du littoral marseillais, le Parc National des Calanques (PNCal) est proposée. Les règles opérationnelles et les règles de choix collectifs sont relativement peu remises en cause alors que les règles constitutionnelles permettant de penser la dynamique des institutions semblent avoir disparu depuis la création.

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Paper provided by Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France in its series AMSE Working Papers with number 1427.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2014
Date of revision: Jun 2014
Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1427
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en

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  1. Patrick D'Aquino & Christophe Le Page & Fran�ois Bousquet & Alassane Bah, 2003. "Using Self-Designed Role-Playing Games and a Multi-Agent System to Empower a Local Decision-Making Process for Land Use Management: the SelfCormas Experiment in Senegal," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 6(3), pages 5.
  2. Janssen, Marco A. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2006. "Governing Social-Ecological Systems," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1465-1509 Elsevier.
  3. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
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