Migration networks as a response to financial constraints: Onset and endogenous dynamics
A migration network is modeled as a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement between financially-constrained individuals who seek to finance and expedite their migration. The cooperation agreement creates a network: “established” migrants contract to support the subsequent migration of others in exchange for receiving support themselves. When the model is expanded to study cooperation between more than two migrants, it emerges that there is a finite optimal size of the migration network. Consequently, would-be migrants in the sending country will form a multitude of networks, rather than a single grand network.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Walter-Flex-Straße 3, D - 53113 Bonn|
Fax: +49 228 / 73-5097
Web page: http://www.zef.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Winters, Paul C. & Davis, Benjamin, 2000.
"Gender, Networks and Mexico-U.S. Migration,"
12901, University of New England, School of Economics.
- Stark, Oded & Lucas, Robert E B, 1988. "Migration, Remittances, and the Family," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(3), pages 465-81, April.
- Gordon H. Hanson & Craig McIntosh, 2007.
"The Great Mexican Emigration,"
NBER Working Papers
13675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carrington, William J & Detragiache, Enrica & Vishwanath, Tara, 1996. "Migration with Endogenous Moving Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 909-30, September.
- Kaivan Munshi, 2003. "Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U. S. Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(2), pages 549-599.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1990.
"The Economics Of Rotating Savings And Credit Associations,"
556, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn, 1993. "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 792-810, September.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1990. "The Economics Of Rotating Savings And Credit Associations," Papers 149, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, 1992. "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 24, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1992. "The economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," Papers 157, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Stark, Oded & Wang, You Qiang, 2002.
Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 159-164, July.
- Lucas, Robert E B & Stark, Oded, 1985. "Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 901-18, October.
- Fan, C. Simon & Stark, Oded, 2007.
"A social proximity explanation of the reluctance to assimilate,"
30940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- C. Simon Fan & Oded Stark, 2007. "A Social Proximity Explanation of the Reluctance to Assimilate," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 55-63, 02.
- Lori A. Beaman, 2012. "Social Networks and the Dynamics of Labour Market Outcomes: Evidence from Refugees Resettled in the U.S," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 128-161.
- Kovsted, Jens & Lyk-Jensen, Peter, 1999. "Rotating savings and credit associations: the choice between random and bidding allocation of funds," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 143-172, October.
- Stark, Oded, 2009.
"Reasons for Remitting,"
52800, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- Anderson, Siwan & Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove, 2009. "Enforcement in informal saving groups," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 14-23, September.
- Sarah Dolfin & Garance Genicot, 2010. "What Do Networks Do? The Role of Networks on Migration and "Coyote" Use," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 343-359, 05.
- Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, 2001.
"Self-selection among undocumented immigrants from Mexico,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2001-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Orrenius, Pia M. & Zavodny, Madeline, 2005. "Self-selection among undocumented immigrants from Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 215-240, October.
- Orrenius, Pia M. & Zavodny, Madeline, 2000. "Self-selection among undocumented immigrants from Mexico," Working Papers 0005, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:ubzefd:132550. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.