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Endogenous Coalition Formation in Rivalry

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  • Tan, Guofu
  • Wang, Ruqu

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  • Tan, Guofu & Wang, Ruqu, 1997. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Rivalry," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273390, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:queddp:273390
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273390
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    3. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    4. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    5. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Saish Nevrekar, 2022. "Efficiency effects on coalition formation in contests," ECON - Working Papers 412, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "Endogenous formation of entrepreneurial networks," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 39-64, January.
    3. Kai Konrad, 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.

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