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Ka Hao Te Rangatahi: New Directions for the New Zealand Scampi Fishery?

Author

Listed:
  • Ogilvie,Shaun
  • Major,Rob
  • Batstone, Chris
  • Mussely, Helen
  • Heasman, Kevin
  • Taylor, Dave
  • Jeffs,Andrew
  • Paine, Glenice

Abstract

This paper addresses the conference themes by describing a Maori commercial fishing enterprise pursuing innovation that will deliver commercial added value while caring for the environment. In 2013 Cawthron Institute and industry partners Waikawa Fishing Company were granted six years’ Ministry for Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE) funding to investigate two options for new directions for New Zealand’s scampi (Metanephrops challengeri) fishery beyond the practices of the current deep water trawl fishery. In this paper we detail the economic rationale for this research, and report progress in the development of innovations for scampi aquaculture and pot fishing industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Ogilvie,Shaun & Major,Rob & Batstone, Chris & Mussely, Helen & Heasman, Kevin & Taylor, Dave & Jeffs,Andrew & Paine, Glenice, "undated". "Ka Hao Te Rangatahi: New Directions for the New Zealand Scampi Fishery?," 2016 Conference, August 25-26, Nelson, New Zealand 260803, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:nzar16:260803
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.260803
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Le Floc'h, Pascal & Fuchs, Jacques & Ifremer, 2001. "Economics of science in fishery sector--the European case," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 133-142, March.
    2. Rustagi, Devesh, 2010. "Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management," MPRA Paper 124049, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ana Maria Leocádio & David Whitmarsh & Margarida Castro, 2012. "Comparing Trawl and Creel Fishing for Norway Lobster (Nephrops norvegicus): Biological and Economic Considerations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(7), pages 1-9, July.
    4. Varadarajan, Rajan, 2009. "Fortune at the bottom of the innovation pyramid: The strategic logic of incremental innovations," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 21-29.
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