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Evaluating Voluntary Programs with Spillovers: The Case of Coal Combustion Products Partnership

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  • Lange, Ian

Abstract

The framework for voluntary program evaluation assumes that voluntary programs provide partners with information that will not be transferred to non-partners. In this framework, a voluntary program is said to be worthwhile if there are significant differences between the behavior of partners and non-partners, correcting for the potential endogeneity of becoming a partner. However, voluntary programs take many different forms; some which are expected to have information transfers (program spillovers) to non-partners. The Coal Combustion Products Partnership (C2P2) is a program to increase the re-use of coal combustion products (CCP) using a structure that is likely to provide spillovers to non-partners. This paper evaluates C2P2 and tests whether program spillovers are affecting non-partners’ behavior. Results suggest that the traditional interpretation would find this program unsuccessful, however when spillovers are considered, evidence points to a successful program.

Suggested Citation

  • Lange, Ian, 2008. "Evaluating Voluntary Programs with Spillovers: The Case of Coal Combustion Products Partnership," National Center for Environmental Economics-NCEE Working Papers 280873, United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:nceewp:280873
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.280873
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August.
    2. Gamper-Rabindran, Shanti, 2006. "Did the EPA's voluntary industrial toxics program reduce emissions? A GIS analysis of distributional impacts and by-media analysis of substitution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 391-410, July.
    3. Robert Innes & Abdoul G. Sam, 2008. "Voluntary Pollution Reductions and the Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of the 33/50 Program," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 271-296, May.
    4. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2007. "Public Voluntary Programs Reconsidered," Working Papers 2007-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
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