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Complementarities in the Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis

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  • Gates, Susan
  • Milgrom, Paul
  • Roberts, John

Abstract

Privatization of firms, price rationalization, free trade and competition policy are all important components of economic reform in former planned economies. We examine the conditions under which these are complementary instruments for improving performance at the level of the firm, so that the benefits from the whole reform package exceed the sum of the benefits of the individual reforms. We also study' how the speed of implementation affect intertemporal resource allocation incentives

Suggested Citation

  • Gates, Susan & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Complementarities in the Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis," Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series 294838, Institute for Policy Reform.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iprwps:294838
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.294838
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
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