IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/iffpr5/42358.html

Spatial Coordination in Public Good Allocation: Nonparametric Evidence from Decentralized Indonesia

Author

Listed:
  • Yamauchi, Futoshi
  • Chowdhury, Shyamal K.
  • Dewina, Reno

Abstract

This paper examines dynamics in public good accessibility and cross-community inequality in Indonesia, using village-level panel data from 2000 to 2006 from their decentralized public-good allocation system. The introduction of decentralization makes public-good investment dependent on initial local income and endowment, and makes it difficult to coordinate investment decisions across communities. Our analysis also shows that possible strategic interactions among communities connected with transportation infrastructure (externalities) implies spatial divergence. Empirical evidence on education and health facilities, however, demonstrates that during the decentralized period, (1) accessibility to school has improved and school investments were effectively coordinated over space; (2) hospital access has improved only marginally; but (3) per-capita availability of schools and local medical clinics (puskesmas) in the community shows convergence toward low-level equilibria. Despite the coordination in spatial allocation even in the decentralization period (observed in intervillage accessibility), endogenous population mobility and growth partially cancel the benefits of the coordinated efforts in public-good allocation. This point requires further policy attention.

Suggested Citation

  • Yamauchi, Futoshi & Chowdhury, Shyamal K. & Dewina, Reno, 2007. "Spatial Coordination in Public Good Allocation: Nonparametric Evidence from Decentralized Indonesia," IFPRI Discussion Papers 42358, CGIAR, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iffpr5:42358
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.42358
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/42358/files/IFPRIDP00741.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.42358?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    2. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2000. "Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 104, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
    3. Joshua Angrist & Eric Bettinger & Erik Bloom & Elizabeth King & Michael Kremer, 2002. "Vouchers for Private Schooling in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1535-1558, December.
    4. Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall.
    5. Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1409-1443, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pranab Bardhan, 2015. "State and Economic Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature," Working Papers id:7060, eSocialSciences.
    2. Tiwari, Smriti, 2017. "Does Local Development Influence Outmigration Decisions? Evidence from Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 108-124.
    3. Sharma, Chanchal Kumar, 2014. "Governance,Governmentality and Governability: Constraints and Possibilities of Decentralization in South Asia," MPRA Paper 61349, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Jan 2015.
    4. di Gregorio, Monica & Hagedorn, Konrad & Kirk, Michael & Korf, Benedikt & McCarthy, Nancy & Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela & Swallow, Brent M., 2008. "Property Rights, Collective Action, and Poverty: The Role of Institutions for Poverty Reduction," CAPRi Working Papers 44354, CGIAR, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    5. Pranab Bardhan, 2016. "State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 862-892, September.
    6. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
    7. Boret, Ny & Gawande, Kishore & Kobb, Daniel P., 2021. "Can decentralization lower poverty? Cambodia’s Commune and Sangkat Fund," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    8. Yuan, Cheng & Zhang, Lei, 2015. "Public education spending and private substitution in urban China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 124-139.
    9. Kahsay, Goytom Abraha & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2020. "Leader turnover and forest management outcomes: Micro-level evidence from Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    10. Norman Gemmell & Richard Kneller & Ismael Sanz, 2013. "Fiscal Decentralization And Economic Growth: Spending Versus Revenue Decentralization," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 1915-1931, October.
    11. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2003. "Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 361-377.
    12. George,Siddharth & Rao,Vijayendra & Sharan,M. R., 2024. "Two Hundred and Fifty-Thousand Democracies : A Review of Village Government in India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10793, The World Bank.
    13. Song, Yang, 2013. "Rising Chinese regional income inequality: The role of fiscal decentralization," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 294-309.
    14. Mauro, Luciano & Pigliaru, Francesco & Carmeci, Gaetano, 2018. "Decentralization and growth: Do informal institutions and rule of law matter?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 873-902.
    15. Saarimaa, Tuukka & Tukiainen, Janne, 2016. "Local representation and strategic voting: Evidence from electoral boundary reforms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 31-45.
    16. Simon Pierre ONANA & Justin Romuald MANGA AMOUGOU, 2025. "Les déterminants de la répartition des transferts fiscaux entre les collectivités territoriales décentralisées : le cas du Cameroun," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 61, pages 47-69.
    17. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Miguel Urquiola, 2002. "When Schools Compete, How Do They Compete? An Assessment of Chile's Nationwide School Voucher Program," Working Papers 123, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    18. Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Whither Russia? A Review of Andrei Shleifer's A Normal Country," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(1), pages 127-146, March.
    19. Jorge Díaz-Lanchas & Peter Mulder, 2021. "Does decentralization of governance promote urban diversity? Evidence from Spain," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(6), pages 1111-1128, June.
    20. Baldwin, Kate & Bhavnani, Rikhil R., 2013. "Ancillary Experiments: Opportunities and Challenges," WIDER Working Paper Series 024, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iffpr5:42358. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifprius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.