IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Nash Equilibrium Tariffs in a Dynamic Stochastic Game: An Application to US and EC Strategic Decisions

Listed author(s):
  • Karp, Larry

Polley making involves dynamics, uncertainty, and strategy, which (although they overlap) can be regarded as separate aspects of the decision maker's problem. Analyzing equilibrium pohc1es (when all considerations are present) and determining how the equilibrium is altered (when one or more aspects ts ignored) are made possible by having an analytical tool that nests dynamics, uncertainty, and strategy and pernuts them to be included in the model in any combination. A tractable dynamic stochastic game (which is such a tool) 1s discussed, and its merits are mdtcated by means of an example of strategic tanff and tax pohc1es involving the USA and European Community.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/197447
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by International Association of Agricultural Economists in its series Occasional Paper Series No. 4 with number 197447.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 1987
Handle: RePEc:ags:iaaeo4:197447
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.iaae-agecon.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Kydland, Finn, 1975. "Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 321-335, June.
  2. Thursby, Marie & Jensen, Richard, 1983. "A conjectural variation approach to strategic tariff equilibria," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1-2), pages 145-161, February.
  3. Edward Tower, 1975. "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 623-630.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iaaeo4:197447. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.