Getting Away With Robbery? Patenting Behavior With The Threat Of Infringement
The paper examines jointly the decision to patent, the optimal patent breadth decision and how these decisions affect, and are affected by, the innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights. A key result is that patenting may occur even when invoking an infringement trial is not profitable for the innovator.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- Waterson, Michael, 1990. "The Economics of Product Patents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 860-69, September.
- Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-51, Spring.
- Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October.
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