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Getting Away With Robbery? Patenting Behavior With The Threat Of Infringement

  • Yiannaka, Amalia
  • Fulton, Murray E.
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    The paper examines jointly the decision to patent, the optimal patent breadth decision and how these decisions affect, and are affected by, the innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights. A key result is that patenting may occur even when invoking an infringement trial is not profitable for the innovator.

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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20304
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    Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number 20304.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20304
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    1. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-51, Spring.
    2. Waterson, Michael, 1990. "The Economics of Product Patents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 860-69, September.
    3. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October.
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