Getting Away With Robbery? Patenting Behavior With The Threat Of Infringement
The paper examines the relationship between the innovator’s patenting and patent breadth decisions as well as how these two decisions affect, and are affected by, the innovator’s ability to enforce her patent rights. An important feature of the model is that the entrant may be able, by his choice of location in product space, to affect the innovator’s decision to defend her patent. An interesting finding of the paper is that the innovator might find it optimal to patent her innovation even when she chooses to not defend her patent by invoking a trial when patent infringement occurs. The paper also shows that, in most cases, the greater is the entrant’s R&D effectiveness, the smaller is the innovator’s incentive to patent her product. If patenting occurs, however, the greater is R&D effectiveness, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering infringement.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: AARES Central Office Manager, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, Canberra ACT 0200|
Phone: 0409 032 338
Web page: http://www.aares.info/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-151, Spring.
- Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, 2002.
"Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 258-274, Summer.
- Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2002. "Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5231, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Erkal, Nisvan, 2005.
"The decision to patent, cumulative innovation, and optimal policy,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 535-562, September.
- Nisvan Erkal, 2003. "The Decision to Patent, Cumulative Innovation,and Optimal Policy," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 877, The University of Melbourne.
- Waterson, Michael, 1990. "The Economics of Product Patents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 860-869, September.
- Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-858, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aare06:139933. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.