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The Non-Neutrality Of Wto Border Tax Adjustments For Environmental Excise Taxes Under Imperfect Competition

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  • McCorriston, Steve
  • Sheldon, Ian M.

Abstract

Border tax adjustments for environmental taxes should leave imports of final goods unchanged. If intermediate and final goods markets are imperfectly competitive though, non-neutrality can result. Under Cournot behavior, an import tax equal to the environmental tax is too high, and under Bertrand, an import subsidy is the appropriate policy.

Suggested Citation

  • McCorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian M., 2002. "The Non-Neutrality Of Wto Border Tax Adjustments For Environmental Excise Taxes Under Imperfect Competition," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19673, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea02:19673
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19673
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    References listed on IDEAS

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