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Regulation and Monitoring with Corrupt Bureaucrats


  • Richard Damania

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)


Most regulatory government agencies to monitor the degree of compliance. These tasks are usually delegated to bureaucrats who, as self interested agents, may engage in corrupt behaviour. Opportunities for bribe taking are most likely to arise when the government (principle) is imperfectly informed about the degree of compliance, but the bureaucrats (agents) are fully informed. This paper outlines a strategy which may be employed to prevent corrupt behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Damania, 1999. "Regulation and Monitoring with Corrupt Bureaucrats," School of Economics Working Papers 1999-04, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:1999-04

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
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    More about this item


    regulatory policy; corruption; environmental and resource economics;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy


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