Regulation and Monitoring with Corrupt Bureaucrats
Most regulatory government agencies to monitor the degree of compliance. These tasks are usually delegated to bureaucrats who, as self interested agents, may engage in corrupt behaviour. Opportunities for bribe taking are most likely to arise when the government (principle) is imperfectly informed about the degree of compliance, but the bureaucrats (agents) are fully informed. This paper outlines a strategy which may be employed to prevent corrupt behaviour.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Environment and Development Economics, 2002, vol. 7, pp. 407-427 as ''Environmental Controls with Corrupt Bureaucrats''|
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- Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
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