Contract labour act in India: a pragmatic view
In order to surpass the stringent regulations, the industry sector in India is largely resorting to contract labourers, who are governed by an Act. A primary survey carried out in an industrially developed state in India, reveals that several stipulations made in the Act are not followed. The workers felt that collusive agreement between the labour inspector, and the entrepreneur (or the contractor) has aided the violation of law. We consider a game theoretic model of Marjit, Rajeev and Mukherjee (2000) to show why such an act is optimal and examine whether any provision of reward for the inspector independent of fines collected by him would help to protect the law.
Volume (Year): 3 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=219|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:ijepee:v:3:y:2010:i:3:p:237-252. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Darren Simpson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.