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Sex, Money and Corruption

  • José A. Rodrigues-Neto

    ()

This paper investigates the consequences of receiving sexual favors or other services as an alternative form of bribery. It infers how these non-monetary payments are made by analyzing the relative effciency of sex bribes and the bargaining power of agents. By assumption, sex payments are less e¢ cient and harder to detect monetary payments. If the Receiver has a sufficiently high (low) utility for consuming sex, then only sex (money) bribes are feasible. In intermediate cases, sexual bribery is offered if and only if the relative bargaining power of the Receiver is sufficiently small compared to that of the Corruptor.

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File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp500.pdf
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Paper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics with number 2009-500.

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Length: 32 Pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2009-500
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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," Discussion Papers 03-038, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "Corruption and auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February.
  3. Sáez Martí, María & Hauk, Esther, 1998. "On the cultural transmission of corruption," UC3M Working papers. Economics 4143, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  4. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Local Corruption and Global Capital Flows," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(2), pages 303-354.
  5. Raul A. Barreto & James Alm, 2001. "Corruption, Optimal Taxation and Growth," School of Economics Working Papers 2001-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  6. Barreto, Raul A., 2000. "Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 35-60, January.
  7. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 599-617.
  8. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
  9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Waldfogel, Joel, 1993. "The Deadweight Loss of Christmas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1328-36, December.
  11. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  12. Rafael Di Tella & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2005. "A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device," Public Economics 0503003, EconWPA.
  13. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
  14. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December.
  15. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
  16. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
  17. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January.
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