Sex, Money and Corruption
This paper investigates the consequences of receiving sexual favors or other services as an alternative form of bribery. It infers how these non-monetary payments are made by analyzing the relative effciency of sex bribes and the bargaining power of agents. By assumption, sex payments are less e¢ cient and harder to detect monetary payments. If the Receiver has a sufficiently high (low) utility for consuming sex, then only sex (money) bribes are feasible. In intermediate cases, sexual bribery is offered if and only if the relative bargaining power of the Receiver is sufficiently small compared to that of the Corruptor.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2009|
|Date of revision:|
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