Incentive to Reduce Cost under Incomplete Information
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References listed on IDEAS
- Thomas, Charles J., 1997. "Disincentives for cost-reducing investment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 359-363, December.
- Jos Jansen, 2010. "STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 349-372, June.
- Routledge, Robert R., 2010. "Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 356-359, June.
- Spulber, Daniel F, 1995. "Bertrand Competition When Rivals' Costs Are Unknown," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 1-11, March.
More about this item
KeywordsCost-reducing technology; Duopoly; Incomplete information; Price competition; Strategic investment;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-08-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-COM-2013-08-31 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-08-31 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-REG-2013-08-31 (Regulation)
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