- Friends?... Fair enough
In: Proceedings of FIKUSZ 2010
Social network analysis is one of the fields in the social sciences which went through a huge development in the last two decades. With the availability of newer tools and methods, in-depth analysis of huge networks became possible resulting in important results at various fields. Despite this advancement, the strength of a tie – a foundation of this theory – is still a hot topic in SNA. This paper aims to provide another approach to tie strength, which is based on one of the internal properties of agents manifesting in human interactions – fairness. An analytical model of tie strength is introduced focusing on fairness concerns of people towards each other. The model is analyzed and an experimental method is shown to test the model. Also pilot results are introduced.
|This chapter was published in: László Áron Kóczy (ed.) Proceedings of FIKUSZ 2010, , pages 72-92, 2010.|
|This item is provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Proceedings of FIKUSZ '10 with number 79-92.|
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