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Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers? Compensation: The Case of Missouri, 1911 to 1926

In: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy

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  • Shawn Everett Kantor
  • Price V. Fishback

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  • Shawn Everett Kantor & Price V. Fishback, 1994. "Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers? Compensation: The Case of Missouri, 1911 to 1926," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 259-298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:6578
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Alston, Lee J. & Ferrie, Joseph P., 1985. "Labor Costs, Paternalism, and Loyalty in Southern Agriculture: A Constraint on the Growth of the Welfare State," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 95-117, March.
    3. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1985. "The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 690-714, August.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    5. Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
    6. Bartel, Ann P & Thomas, Lacy Glenn, 1985. "Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-25, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shawn E. Kantor, 1994. "A Prelude to the Welfare State: Compulsory State Insurance and Workers' Compensation in Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington, 1911-1919," NBER Historical Working Papers 0064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Fishback, Price V & Kantor, Shawn Everett, 1998. "The Adoption of Workers' Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 305-341, October.
    3. Fishback, Price V. & Kantor, Shawn Everett, 1998. "The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels, 1910-1930," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 109-139, April.

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