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Social-Welfare-Enhancing Collusion and Trade

In: Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation

Listed author(s):
  • George Deltas
  • Alberto Salvo
  • Helder Vasconcelos

Bringing scholars and policymakers to the frontiers of research and addressing the critical issues of the day, the book presents original important new theoretical and empirical results. The distinguished contributors include: P. Agrel, K. Alexander, J. Crémer, X. Dassiou, G. Deltas, F. Etro, L. Filistrucchi, P. Fotis, M. Gilli, J. Harrington Jr, T. Huertas, M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, V. Marques, M. Peitz, Y. Spiegel, E. Tarrantino and G. Wood.

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This chapter was published in:
  • Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), 2012. "Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14933.
  • This item is provided by Edward Elgar Publishing in its series Chapters with number 14933_7.
    Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14933_7
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.e-elgar.com

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    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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    1. Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983. "A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
    2. Banal-Estanol, Albert, 2007. "Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 31-49, February.
    3. Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 1996. "Coupons and oligopolistic price discrimination," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 227-242.
    4. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    5. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Frode Steen, 2006. "On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian Cement Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 321-338, March.
    6. Øystein Foros & Bjørn Hansen & Jan Sand, 2002. "Demand-side Spillovers and Semi-collusion in the Mobile Communications Market," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 259-278, September.
    7. George Deltas & Alberto Salvo & Helder Vasconcelos, 2012. "Consumer-surplus-enhancing collusion and trade," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(2), pages 315-328, 06.
    8. Richard Friberg & Mattias Ganslandt, 2008. "Reciprocal Dumping with Product Differentiation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 942-954, November.
    9. Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
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