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Rethinking Regulatory Capture

In: Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation

Author

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  • Per J. Agrell
  • Axel Gautier

Abstract

Bringing scholars and policymakers to the frontiers of research and addressing the critical issues of the day, the book presents original important new theoretical and empirical results. The distinguished contributors include: P. Agrel, K. Alexander, J. Crémer, X. Dassiou, G. Deltas, F. Etro, L. Filistrucchi, P. Fotis, M. Gilli, J. Harrington Jr, T. Huertas, M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, V. Marques, M. Peitz, Y. Spiegel, E. Tarrantino and G. Wood.

Suggested Citation

  • Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2012. "Rethinking Regulatory Capture," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14933_14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    2. Guerriero, Carmine, 2011. "Accountability in government and regulatory policies: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 453-469.
    3. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2010. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521681599, November.
    4. David Martimort, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(4), pages 929-947.
    5. Duranton, Gilles & Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2010. "The Economics of Clusters: Lessons from the French Experience," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199592203.
    6. Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), 2012. "Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14933.
    7. Fleurbaey,Marc & Maniquet,François, 2011. "A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521887427, September.
    8. Yeon-Koo Che, 1995. "Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 378-397, Autumn.
    9. Huriot,Jean-Marie & Thisse,Jacques-François (ed.), 2009. "Economics of Cities," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521118279, October.
    10. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2017. "A Theory of Soft Capture," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 571-596, July.
    11. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, September.
    12. Makkai, Toni & Braithwaite, John, 1992. "In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 61-78, January.
    13. Russell Smyth & Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 292-312, December.
    14. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    15. David J. Salant, 1995. "Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 362-377, Autumn.
    16. Clare Leaver, 2009. "Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 572-607, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Does Regulatory Independence Translate into a Higher Degree of Liberalization? - Evidence from EU Energy Regulators," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-545, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    2. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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