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George Georgiadis

Personal Details

First Name:George
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Last Name:Georgiadis
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RePEc Short-ID:pge184
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://people.bu.edu/gjg/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Boston University

Boston, Massachusetts (United States)
http://www.bu.edu/econ/
RePEc:edi:decbuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. George Georgiadis, 2015. "Projects and Team Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(1), pages 187-218.
  2. Georgiadis, George & Tang, Christopher S., 2014. "Optimal reservation policies and market segmentation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 81-99.
  3. George Georgiadis & Steven A. Lippman & Christopher S. Tang, 2014. "Project design with limited commitment and teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 598-623, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. George Georgiadis, 2015. "Projects and Team Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(1), pages 187-218.

    Cited by:

    1. Matros, Alexander & Ponomareva, Natalia & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2022. "Search without looking," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    2. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Long, Ngo Van, 2019. "A Dynamic Analysis of Climate Change Mitigation with Endogenous Number of Contributors: Loose vs Tight Cooperation," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-92, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Bowen, T. Renee & Georgiadis, George & Lambert, Nicolas, 2016. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 11602, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Rauber, Tom & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2025. "Dynamic interaction and the ineffectiveness of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    5. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Experimentation in Organizations," Working Paper 6631, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    6. Wang, Chengsi & Zudenkova, Galina, 2016. "Non-monotonic group-size effect in repeated provision of public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 116-128.
    7. Guillaume Roels & Charles J. Corbett, 2024. "Too Many Meetings? Scheduling Rules for Team Coordination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(12), pages 8647-8667, December.
    8. George Georgiadis & Steven A. Lippman & Christopher S. Tang, 2014. "Project design with limited commitment and teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 598-623, September.
    9. Morvarid Rahmani & Guillaume Roels & Uday S. Karmarkar, 2018. "Team Leadership and Performance: Combining the Roles of Direction and Contribution," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(11), pages 5234-5249, November.
    10. Niko Jaakkola & Florian Wagener, 2020. "All Symmetric Equilibria in Differential Games with Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 8246, CESifo.
    11. Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa & Ngo Van Long, 2022. "A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2022s-01, CIRANO.
    12. Wioletta Dziuda & Ronen Gradwohl, 2015. "Achieving Cooperation under Privacy Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 142-173, August.
    13. Yang, Nian & Yang, Jun & Chen, Yu, 2024. "Contracting with cost synergies: Continuous-time double-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    14. Goutham Takasi & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2023. "Optimal cardinal contests," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(11), pages 3433-3451, November.
    15. Gregorio Curello, 2021. "Incentives for Collective Innovation," Papers 2109.01885, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    16. Tajika, Tomoya, 2020. "Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 228-239.
    17. Altınok, Ahmet & Yılmaz, Murat, 2018. "Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project under time inconsistency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 114-140.
    18. Alessandro Bonatti & Doruk Cetemen & Juuso Toikka, 2026. "Optimal Project Management," Papers 2609.35238, arXiv.org.
    19. Alex Barrachina & Eduardo Jiménez-Fernández, 2025. "The step-level public good aspect of equity crowdfunding: A game-theoretic analysis," Rationality and Society, , vol. 37(3), pages 300-337, August.
    20. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    21. Nicolas Lambert & George Georgiadis & Renee Bowen, 2016. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision: Real versus Formal Authority," 2016 Meeting Papers 197, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    22. Sebastien Rouillon, 2018. "Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-24, September.
    23. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 2020. "Repeated Interaction in Teams: Tenure and Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1496-1507, March.
    24. Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir, 2016. "Duplicative Search," Working Papers 2016-02, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    25. Morvarid Rahmani & Guillaume Roels & Uday S. Karmarkar, 2017. "Collaborative Work Dynamics in Projects with Co‐Production," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 26(4), pages 686-703, April.
    26. Huseyin Yildirim, 2023. "Who fares better in teamwork?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 299-324, June.
    27. Matros, Alexander & Ponomareva, Natalia & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2019. "Search without observability," Working Papers 2019-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    28. Cao, Dan, 2014. "Racing under uncertainty: Boundary value problem approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 508-527.
    29. Georgiadis, George, 2017. "Deadlines and infrequent monitoring in the dynamic provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-12.
    30. Hattori, Keisuke, 2026. "The Finisher's Paradox: Handoff Quality in Deadline-Constrained Teams," EconStor Preprints 342018, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    31. Saltuk Özerturk & Huseyin Yildirim, 2019. "Credit Attribution and Collaborative Work," Departmental Working Papers 1907, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    32. Qi Luo & Romesh Saigal, 2020. "Dynamic Multiagent Incentive Contracts: Existence, Uniqueness, and Implementation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, December.
    33. Cetemen, Doruk & Hwang, Ilwoo & Kaya, Ayça, 2020. "Uncertainty-driven cooperation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    34. Giorgio Fabbri & Silvia Faggian & Giuseppe Freni, 2024. "On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks," Working Papers 2024-03, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    35. Xu, Boli, 2026. "Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), January.
    36. Ozerturk, Saltuk & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2025. "Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 246-266.
    37. Xiang Yu & Yuchong Zhang & Zhou Zhou, 2020. "Teamwise Mean Field Competitions," Papers 2006.14472, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    38. Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    39. Külpmann, Philipp, 2015. "Procrastination and projects," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 544, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    40. Giorgio Fabbri & Silvia Faggian & Giuseppe Freni, 2022. "On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks: an extended version," Working Papers hal-03888256, HAL.
    41. Jakša Cvitanić & George Georgiadis, 2016. "Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 309-342, November.
    42. Philipp Külpmann, 2026. "Projects with uncertain requirements and deadlines," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 81(3), pages 835-864, May.
    43. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2025. "The economics of career concerns in teamwork," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    44. de Roos, Nicolas & Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Shipwrecks and treasure hunters," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 259-283.

  2. Georgiadis, George & Tang, Christopher S., 2014. "Optimal reservation policies and market segmentation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 81-99.

    Cited by:

    1. Jaelynn Oh & Xuanming Su, 2022. "Optimal Pricing and Overbooking of Reservations," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(3), pages 928-940, March.
    2. Tunçalp, Feray & Güneş, Evrim D. & Örmeci, E. Lerzan, 2024. "Modeling strategic walk-in patients in appointment systems: Equilibrium behavior and capacity allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 587-601.
    3. Roma, Paolo & Panniello, Umberto & Lo Nigro, Giovanna, 2019. "Sharing economy and incumbents' pricing strategy: The impact of Airbnb on the hospitality industry," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 17-29.
    4. Raza, Syed Asif, 2015. "An integrated approach to price differentiation and inventory decisions with demand leakage," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 105-117.
    5. Wen Zhang & Yi He, 2020. "Optimal advance selling discount strategy with future‐oriented consumers," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(3), pages 308-320, April.
    6. Yunjuan Kuang & Li Jiang, 2023. "Managing presales with two payments and return policy when consumers are time‐inconsistent," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(11), pages 3594-3613, November.
    7. Fatemeh Binesh & Amanda Belarmino & Carola Raab, 2021. "A meta-analysis of hotel revenue management," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(5), pages 546-558, October.
    8. Yadegaridehkordi, Elaheh & Nilashi, Mehrbakhsh & Nizam Bin Md Nasir, Mohd Hairul & Momtazi, Saeedeh & Samad, Sarminah & Supriyanto, Eko & Ghabban, Fahad, 2021. "Customers segmentation in eco-friendly hotels using multi-criteria and machine learning techniques," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    9. Kuthambalayan, Thyagaraj S. & Mehta, Peeyush & Shanker, Kripa, 2015. "Managing product variety with advance selling and capacity restrictions," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(PA), pages 287-296.

  3. George Georgiadis & Steven A. Lippman & Christopher S. Tang, 2014. "Project design with limited commitment and teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 598-623, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Bowen, T. Renee & Georgiadis, George & Lambert, Nicolas, 2016. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 11602, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    2. Rauber, Tom & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2025. "Dynamic interaction and the ineffectiveness of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    3. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Experimentation in Organizations," Working Paper 6631, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    4. Morvarid Rahmani & Guillaume Roels & Uday S. Karmarkar, 2018. "Team Leadership and Performance: Combining the Roles of Direction and Contribution," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(11), pages 5234-5249, November.
    5. Alessandro Bonatti & Doruk Cetemen & Juuso Toikka, 2026. "Optimal Project Management," Papers 2609.35238, arXiv.org.
    6. Alex Barrachina & Eduardo Jiménez-Fernández, 2025. "The step-level public good aspect of equity crowdfunding: A game-theoretic analysis," Rationality and Society, , vol. 37(3), pages 300-337, August.
    7. Nicolas Lambert & George Georgiadis & Renee Bowen, 2016. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision: Real versus Formal Authority," 2016 Meeting Papers 197, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Georgiadis, George, 2017. "Deadlines and infrequent monitoring in the dynamic provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-12.
    9. Jakša Cvitanić & George Georgiadis, 2016. "Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 309-342, November.
    10. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2017. "Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines: The Role of Commitment," ISER Discussion Paper 1015, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    11. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.

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