Monopoly innovation and welfare effects
In this paper we study the welfare effect of a monopoly innovation. Unlike many partial equilibrium models carried out in previous studies, general equilibrium models are constructed and analyzed in greater detail. We discover that technical innovation carried out by a monopolist could significantly increase the social welfare. We conclude that, in general, the criticism against monopoly innovation based on its increased deadweight loss is less accurate than previously postulated by many studies.
Volume (Year): 4 (2010)
Issue (Month): ()
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- Flavio Delbono & Vincenzo Denicolo, 1991.
"Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 951-961.
- F. Delbono & V. Denicolo, 1988. "Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly," Working Papers 44, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Hill, Martyn & Waterson, Michael, 1983. "Labor-managed Cournot oligopoly and industry output," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 43-51, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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