Legitimation, Kooptation, Repression und das Überleben von Autokratien „im Umfeld autokratischer Wahlen". Eine Replik auf den Beitrag von Hans Lueders und Aurel Croissant
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Keywords
Legitimation; autoritäres System; Repression; Wahl; politisches System; Determinanten; Herrschaftssicherung;All these keywords.
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