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Commentary: Governance of and Through Central Banks: A Comparative Analysis at the Close of a Dismal Decade

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  • Henrique Estides Delgado

Abstract

This commentary seeks to summarize, assess, and make integrated sense of three scholarly works that, together, help to shed light on the discussion regarding central banks’ scope, mandate, power, and independence. The issue is clearly relevant in comparative politics as one building block to evaluate both state capacities to manage the domestic economic environment routinely and the global crises faced recently. Within a period of 13 years, central banks across the world were at the center of the response to two different but highly devastating crises. The level of power enjoyed nowadays by central banks is, to a large extent, an outcome of the evolution following the 2008 crisis, which better equipped these institutions to provide some necessary economic policy interventions in 2020. The articles here reviewed are fine contributions to empirical observation and future research in this area. Este comentario busca resumir, evaluar y dar sentido integrado a tres trabajos académicos que, en conjunto, ayudan a arrojar luz sobre la discusión sobre el alcance, el mandato, el poder y la independencia de los bancos centrales. El tema es claramente relevante en la política comparada como un bloque de construcción para evaluar tanto las capacidades estatales para manejar el entorno económico doméstico de manera rutinaria como las crisis globales enfrentadas recientemente. En un período de 13 años, los bancos centrales de todo el mundo estuvieron en el centro de la respuesta a dos crisis diferentes pero muy devastadoras. El nivel de poder del que disfrutan hoy los bancos centrales es, en gran medida, un resultado de la evolución posterior a la crisis de 2008, que equipó mejor a estas instituciones para proporcionar algunas intervenciones de política económica necesarias en 2020. Los artículos aquí revisados son excelentes contribuciones a la observación e investigación futura en esta área. 该评论文试图总结、评估、并整合理解三部学术作品,以期阐明关于央行范围、授权、权力和独立的探讨。该议题在比较政治中具有相关性,它有助于评价国家在按例管理国内经济环境方面的能力和全球危机。在13年里,全球央行位于两次不同的、具有高度破坏性的危机的响应中心。如今央行拥有的权力在很大程度上归因于2008年金融危机以来发生的演变,该演变让这些机构更有准备,为2020年提供必要的经济政策干预。 本文所评论的高质量文章对该领域未来的实证观察和研究之路作出了贡献。

Suggested Citation

  • Henrique Estides Delgado, 2021. "Commentary: Governance of and Through Central Banks: A Comparative Analysis at the Close of a Dismal Decade," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 184(1), pages 101-118, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:woraff:v:184:y:2021:i:1:p:101-118
    DOI: 10.1177/0043820021989989
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    3. Temin, Peter, 2017. "The Vanishing Middle Class: Prejudice and Power in a Dual Economy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262036169, December.
    4. Blyth, Mark, 2013. "Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199828302.
    5. Howard Davies & David Green, 2010. "Banking on the Future: The Fall and Rise of Central Banking," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9154, December.
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