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The Success of American Communes

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  • Clifford F. Thies

Abstract

This study analyzes the effect of the structure of communes on their success, using the data of 281 communes started in America from 1683 to 1937. Factors increasing the likelihood of success include (i) being a pietist religious sect, (ii) inducing commitment as measured by an index of several underlying variables, (iii) allowing some private property, and (iv) with some qualification, having anarchic governance. These results support the prevailing commitment hypothesis. They additionally indicate that communes can increase their likelihood of success by making some concessions to egoistic concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Clifford F. Thies, 2000. "The Success of American Communes," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(1), pages 186-199, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:186-199
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2000.tb00328.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    2. John Baden & Richard Stroup, 1972. "Choice, faith, and politics: The political economy of hutterian communes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, March.
    3. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
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