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Reasons for Secrecy and Deception in Homeland‐Security Resource Allocation

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  • Jun Zhuang
  • Vicki M. Bier

Abstract

In this article, we explore reasons that a defender might prefer secrecy or deception about her defensive resource allocations, rather than disclosure, in a homeland‐security context. Our observations not only summarize and synthesize the results of existing game‐theoretic work, but also provide intuitions about promising future research directions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jun Zhuang & Vicki M. Bier, 2010. "Reasons for Secrecy and Deception in Homeland‐Security Resource Allocation," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(12), pages 1737-1743, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:riskan:v:30:y:2010:i:12:p:1737-1743
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01455.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wei Wang & Francesco Di Maio & Enrico Zio, 2019. "Adversarial Risk Analysis to Allocate Optimal Defense Resources for Protecting Cyber–Physical Systems from Cyber Attacks," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(12), pages 2766-2785, December.
    2. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ye, Yanqing & Tan, Yuejin, 2020. "How to protect a genuine target against an attacker trying to detect false targets," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 553(C).
    3. Xiaojun Shan & Jun Zhuang, 2013. "Cost of Equity in Homeland Security Resource Allocation in the Face of a Strategic Attacker," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(6), pages 1083-1099, June.
    4. Tania Wallis & Rafał Leszczyna, 2022. "EE-ISAC—Practical Cybersecurity Solution for the Energy Sector," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-23, March.
    5. Jesus Rios & David Rios Insua, 2012. "Adversarial Risk Analysis for Counterterrorism Modeling," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(5), pages 894-915, May.
    6. Vineet M. Payyappalli & Jun Zhuang & Victor Richmond R. Jose, 2017. "Deterrence and Risk Preferences in Sequential Attacker–Defender Games with Continuous Efforts," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(11), pages 2229-2245, November.
    7. Olive Emil Wetter & Valentino Wüthrich, 2015. "“What is dear to you?” Survey of beliefs regarding protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism," Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 185-198, September.
    8. Natalie M. Scala & Allison C. Reilly & Paul L. Goethals & Michel Cukier, 2019. "Risk and the Five Hard Problems of Cybersecurity," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(10), pages 2119-2126, October.
    9. Nageswara S. V. Rao & Stephen W. Poole & Chris Y. T. Ma & Fei He & Jun Zhuang & David K. Y. Yau, 2016. "Defense of Cyber Infrastructures Against Cyber‐Physical Attacks Using Game‐Theoretic Models," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 694-710, April.
    10. Yanling Chang & Alan Erera & Chelsea White, 2015. "Value of information for a leader–follower partially observed Markov game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 235(1), pages 129-153, December.
    11. Peiqiu Guan & Jun Zhuang, 2016. "Modeling Resources Allocation in Attacker‐Defender Games with “Warm Up” CSF," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 776-791, April.
    12. Michael Greenberg & Karen Lowrie, 2019. "Vicki Bier: A More Sensible Way to View Risk," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(4), pages 744-748, April.
    13. Brian A Jackson & David R Frelinger & Jennifer Kavanagh & Brett A Wallace, 2021. "Adaptation by intelligent adversaries to defensive measures: framing adaptation options and demonstrating assessment of attacker preferences using proxy intelligence data," The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, , vol. 18(2), pages 61-85, April.
    14. Jie Xu & Jun Zhuang, 2016. "Modeling costly learning and counter-learning in a defender-attacker game with private defender information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 236(1), pages 271-289, January.
    15. Chen Wang & Vicki M. Bier, 2016. "Quantifying Adversary Capabilities to Inform Defensive Resource Allocation," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 756-775, April.
    16. Meilin He & Laura Devine & Jun Zhuang, 2018. "Perspectives on Cybersecurity Information Sharing among Multiple Stakeholders Using a Decision‐Theoretic Approach," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(2), pages 215-225, February.
    17. David Rios Insua & David Banks & Jesus Rios, 2016. "Modeling Opponents in Adversarial Risk Analysis," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 742-755, April.
    18. González-Ortega, Jorge & Ríos Insua, David & Cano, Javier, 2019. "Adversarial risk analysis for bi-agent influence diagrams: An algorithmic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(3), pages 1085-1096.
    19. Hunt, Kyle & Agarwal, Puneet & Zhuang, Jun, 2021. "Technology adoption for airport security: Modeling public disclosure and secrecy in an attacker-defender game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).

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