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The surprising benefits of a parallel universe

Author

Listed:
  • Manfredi M.A. La Manna

    (Department of Economics, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK)

Abstract

Suppose that the successful completion of a project requires performing n tasks, each of which has a probability of success p. The paper establishes under what conditions it may be profitable to engage in parallel multi-tasking, i.e. tackling each task by following two independent routes. It is found that for ∀n>1 parallel multi-tasking is profitable for a wide range of parameters when costs are linear and is always profitable for convex costs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Manfredi M.A. La Manna, 2009. "The surprising benefits of a parallel universe," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 109-117.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:109-117
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1441
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vishwanath, Tara, 1992. "Optimal Orderings for Parallel Project Selection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(1), pages 79-89, February.
    2. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "Contest architecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 70-96, January.
    3. Manfredi M. A. La Manna, 2008. "Assessing The Assessment Or, The Rae And The Optimal Organization Of University Research," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(5), pages 637-653, November.
    4. Vishwanath, Tara, 1992. "Parallel Search for the Best Alternative," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(4), pages 495-507, October.
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