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Discrimination in the Labour Market: The Curse of Competition between Workers

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Haan
  • Theo Offerman
  • Randolph Sloof

Abstract

Forthcoming in the 'Economic Journal' . In the labor market, statistical discrimination occurs when employers' beliefs about workers' behavior induce different groups of workers to invest at different rates in their education. Thus, even though groups may be identical ex-ante, the beliefs of the employers are self-fulfilling. Theoretically and in an experiment, we investigate under what circumstances statistical discrimination occurs. We confirm the experimental results of Fryer, Goeree and Holt (2005) who do not find systematic evidence for statistical discrimination in the standard no-competition setup of Coate and Loury (1993). When we introduce competition between workers of different groups, the non-discrimination equilibrium ceases to be stable. In line with this theoretical observation, we find systematic discrimination in the experimental treatment with competition. Nevertheless, a substantial minority of the employers refuses to discriminate even when it is in their best interest to do so. A refined model that allows a fraction of the employers to remain color blind organizes the main patterns in the data.
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Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Haan & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2017. "Discrimination in the Labour Market: The Curse of Competition between Workers," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(603), pages 1433-1466, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:603:p:1433-1466
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2017.127.issue-603
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robin, Stéphane & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Ingratiation: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 16-38.
    2. Antonio Filippin & Francesco Guala, 2013. "Costless discrimination and unequal achievements in an experimental tournament," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 285-305, September.
    3. Valencia,Christian & Janzen,Sarah Ann & Ghorpade,Yashodhan & Abdur Rahman,Amanina Binti, 2024. "Soft Skills, Competition, and Hiring Discrimination," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10755, The World Bank.
    4. He, Simin, 2019. "Minority advantage and disadvantage in competition and coordination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 464-482.
    5. Sue H. Mialon, 2024. "Inherited inequality and discrimination," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 38(2), pages 256-277, June.
    6. Dianat, Ahrash & Echenique, Federico & Yariv, Leeat, 2022. "Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 41-58.
    7. Jin, Cheng-Xiao & Yu, Jia-Qi, 2025. "Does the popularization of artificial intelligence increase the risk of corporate digital responsibility?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    8. Attakrit Leckcivilize & Alexander Straub, 2018. "Headscarf and job recruitment—lifting the veil of labour market discrimination," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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