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Incentive compensation schemes: Experimental calibration of the rationality hypothesis

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  • ALISON J. KIRBY

Abstract

. Behavior inconsistent with expected utility maximization is widely observed and explanations for it abound. The purpose of this research is to identify conditions under which choice behavior is most likely to be consistent with EUM predictions, in order to ensure the successful implementation of economic prescriptions derived under the assumption of EUM rationality. Specifically, a laboratory experiment is used to test the hypothesis that the distinctness between alternatives in a menu of contracts is crucial in determining the likelihood that agent choices are consistent with EUM predictions, and consequently, in the case of incentive compatible contracts, leads to accurate revelation of private information. The results support this hypothesis. Résumé. L'on observe fréquemment des comportements incompatibles avec la maximisation espérée de l'utilité, et les explications à ce sujet foisonnent. L'étude qui suit a pour but de déterminer dans quelles conditions le comportement de choix est le plus susceptible d'être conforme aux prédictions relatives à la maximisation espérée de l'utilité (MEU), et de garantir ainsi le succès de l'implantation des prescriptions économiques dérivées de l'hypothèse de la rationalité de la MEU. De façon plus précise, l'auteure procède à une expérience de laboratoire pour vérifier l'hypothèse selon laquelle la clarté des différentes possibilités d'un menu de contrats est cruciale dans la détermination de la probabilité que les choix du mandataire soient conformes aux prédictions relatives à la MEU et qu'en conséquence, dans le cas de contrats qui se prêtent à l'application de mesures d'incitation, cette clarté ne masque pas la révélation de la véritable information privilégiée. Les résultats de l'étude confirment cette hypothèse.

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  • Alison J. Kirby, 1992. "Incentive compensation schemes: Experimental calibration of the rationality hypothesis," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 374-408, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:374-408
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1992.tb00850.x
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    5. Joyce E. Berg & Lane A. Daley & John W. Dickhaut & John R. O'Brien, 1986. "Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 281-306.
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    1. John O'Brien, 1992. "Discussion of “Incentive compensation schemes: Experimental calibration of the rationality hypothesisâ€," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 415-418, March.
    2. Luft, Joan & Shields, Michael D., 2003. "Mapping management accounting: graphics and guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 169-249.
    3. Nicholas Dopuch, 1992. "Discussion of “Incentive compensation schemes: Experimental calibration of the rationality hypothesisâ€," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 409-414, March.

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