CO2 Emission Trading – A Tool for the Austrian Climate Strategy
International commitments constitute a considerable challenge for the climate policy pursued in Austria. In 1997, the first obligatory targets for greenhouse gas emission rates were defined by the Kyoto Protocol, and Austria, within the scope of an internal EU burden sharing agreement, agreed to cut its emissions by 13 percent against the 1990 level. The Kyoto Protocol raised great expectations with regard to reducing anthropogenic effects on the climate change. In November 2000, the Sixth Session of the UN FCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 6) will be held in The Hague. Its outcome is likely to affect the probability that the Kyoto Protocol will be ratified. Achieving the emission targets is to be facilitated by the introduction of so-called flexible mechanisms laid down in the Kyoto Protocol, which include emission trading. A key aspect of emission trading is its economic efficiency, i.e., it provides a market mechanism to ensure that necessary reductions will be made where their costs are lowest. Emission trading is also effective from an environmental policy point of view because it makes sure that the specified environmental goal will be attained. The trade in emission licences offers an incentive to exceed individual goals and thus be able to sell surplus licences. This provides an incentive to search for cost-effective ways to reduce emissions, which in turn promotes technical change and the development of environmentally friendly technologies. Key aspects of the framework for national CO2 emission trading system are the sectoral emission structure and existing taxes on energy. From the sectoral emission structure in Austria it can be seen that CO2 emissions in manufacturing are concentrated on a few sectors and a small number of companies. With regard to energy-related taxes, consideration should be given to how taxation can be used for companies and sectors which do not participate in the emission trading system.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 73 (2000)
Issue (Month): 11 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Arsenal Object 20, A-1030 Wien|
Phone: (+43 1) 798 26 01-0
Fax: (+43 1) 798 93 86
Web page: http://www.wifo.ac.at/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Austrian Institute of Economic Research Publikationsverkauf und Abonnentenbetreuung Arsenal, Objekt 20 A-1030 Vienna/Austria|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zhang, Zhong Xiang, 1999. "International greenhouse gas emissions trading: who should be held liable for the non-compliance by sellers?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 323-329, December.
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2002.
"Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather,"
Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 333-345, March.
- Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter, 1998. "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Discussion Papers dp-98-34, Resources For the Future.
- Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 2002. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Papers of Peter Cramton 02eptc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 06 May 2002.
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers 197846, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Zhang, Zhong Xiang, 1999. "Should the rules of allocating emissions permits be harmonised?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 11-18, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wfo:monber:y:2000:i:11:p:663-673. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ilse Schulz)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.