IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vrs/njopap/v8y2015i1p41-59n3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does the Lowest Bid Price Evaluation Criterion Make for a More Efficient Public Procurement Selection Criterion? (Case of the Czech Republic)

Author

Listed:
  • Ochrana František
  • Hrnčířová Kristýna

    (Center for Social and Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague.)

Abstract

Through the institute of public procurement a considerable volume of financial resources is allocated. It is therefore in the interest of contracting entities to seek ways of how to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Some public contract-awarding entities, along with some public-administration authorities in the Czech Republic, believe that the use of a single evaluation criterion (the lowest bid price) results in a more efficient tender for a public contract. It was found that contracting entities in the Czech Republic strongly prefer to use the lowest bid price criterion. Within the examined sample, 86.5 % of public procurements were evaluated this way. The analysis of the examined sample of public contracts proved that the choice of an evaluation criterion, even the preference of the lowest bid price criterion, does not have any obvious impact on the final cost of a public contract. The study concludes that it is inappropriate to prefer the criterion of the lowest bid price within the evaluation of public contracts that are characterised by their complexity (including public contracts for construction works and public service contracts). The findings of the Supreme Audit Office related to the inspection of public contracts indicate that when using the lowest bid price as an evaluation criterion, a public contract may indeed be tendered with the lowest bid price, but not necessarily the best offer in terms of supplied quality. It is therefore not appropriate to use the lowest bid price evaluation criterion to such an extent for the purpose of evaluating work and services. Any improvement to this situation requires a corresponding amendment to the Law on Public Contracts and mainly a radical change in the attitude of the Office for the Protection of Competition towards proposed changes, as indicated within the conclusions and recommendations proposed by this study.

Suggested Citation

  • Ochrana František & Hrnčířová Kristýna, 2015. "Does the Lowest Bid Price Evaluation Criterion Make for a More Efficient Public Procurement Selection Criterion? (Case of the Czech Republic)," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 41-59, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:8:y:2015:i:1:p:41-59:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/nispa-2015-0003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/nispa-2015-0003
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/nispa-2015-0003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atsushi Iimi, 2006. "Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(2), pages 109-128, March.
    2. Beáta Mikušová Meričková & Jan Stejskal, 2014. "Hodnota statku kolektivní spotřeby [Value of Collective Consumption Goods]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(2), pages 216-231.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michal Plaček & Martin Schmidt & František Ochrana & Michal Půček, 2017. "Do the Selected Characteristics of Public Tenders Affect the Likelihood of Filing Petitions with the Regulators of Public Tenders?," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(3), pages 317-329.
    2. İlke Onur & Rasim Özcan & Bedri Taş, 2012. "Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(3), pages 207-223, May.
    3. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2009. "Joint Bidding, Governance And Public Procurement Costs:A Case Of Road Projects," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(3), pages 393-429, September.
    4. Luis Mario García Lafuente & Asunción Mochón Sáez, 2022. "Competition effects in EU external aid supply tenders funded with the Pre-accession and Neighbourhood instruments," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 461-484, May.
    5. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2008. "Procurement efficiency for infrastructure development and financial needs reassessed," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4662, The World Bank.
    6. Hiroshi Ohashi, 2009. "Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(3), pages 267-285, May.
    7. Antonio Estache & A. Iimi, 2009. "Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds: Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement," Working Papers ECARES 2009_006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Ilke Onur & Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019. "Optimal bidder participation in public procurement auctions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 595-617, June.
    9. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2011. "(Un)bundling infrastructure procurement: Evidence from water supply and sewage projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 104-114, June.
    10. Atsushi Iimi, 2013. "Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(3), pages 243-261, November.
    11. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2014. "How to Achieve Efficiency in Public Procurement Auctions," EcoMod2014 6728, EcoMod.
    12. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2010. "Bidder Asymmetry in Infrastructure Procurement: Are There any Fringe Bidders?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 163-187, March.
    13. Jan Pavel & Emília Sičáková-Beblavá, 2012. "Postkontraktační chování veřejných zadavatelů na Slovensku [Post-Contractual Behaviour of Public Contracting Authorities in the Slovak Republic]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(5), pages 635-648.
    14. Barbosa, Klênio & Fiuza, Eduardo Pedral Sampaio, 2012. "Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies," Textos para discussão 299, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    15. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Søreide, Tina, 2017. "An economic analysis of debarment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 36-49.
    16. Grega Matus & Orviska Marta & Nemec Juraj & Lawson Colin, 2019. "Factors Determining the Efficiency of Slovak Public Procurement," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 12(1), pages 43-68, June.
    17. Martin Schmidt, 2015. "Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(1), pages 49-62.
    18. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2012. "Quality or Price? Evidence from ODA-Financed Public Procurement," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(4), pages 435-469, July.
    19. Nakanishi, Yoshinobu, 2022. "Determinants of the number of bidders and win-reserve ratio in open competitive tendering: Relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    20. Jan Pavel & Emilia Sičáková-Beblavá, 2013. "Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(1), pages 111-124.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:8:y:2015:i:1:p:41-59:n:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciendo.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.