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Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

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  • Špačková Zuzana

    (University of Defence in Brno, Czech Republic.)

  • Špaček David

    (Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University, Czech Republic.)

Abstract

Since its origins, when it was mainly connected to the field of economics, game theory has brought important theoretic insights into many domains. Besides biology, philosophy or computer science, its findings have been applied to various fields of public policy. One specific area of public policy is that of security. Within the last two decades we have been witnesses to a significant increase in efforts to model security issues using tools of game theory and to derive political implications. The paper deals with the model of a Stackelberg security game and its real-world applications in security domains. The main aim and purpose of the paper is to provide a survey of selected cases of real-world deployed applications of the game-theoretic Stackelberg model in the area of public security and, based on the literature analysis, to discuss the potential and limitations of the model for policy- and decision-makers that are dealing with security measures on various governmental levels. Existing cases clearly indicate that the model can contribute to a better design and implementation of the security policy and help implement a better allocation of resources and thus potentially improve the effectiveness of security measures. On the other hand, the paper also discusses some limitations and potential future adjustments of the model together with points for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Špačková Zuzana & Špaček David, 2020. "Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 13(2), pages 249-272, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:13:y:2020:i:2:p:249-272:n:14
    DOI: 10.2478/nispa-2020-0024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas A. Birkland, 2009. "Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era1," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 26(4), pages 423-438, July.
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    3. Mikhael Shor, 2003. "Game Theory .net," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 388-388, December.
    4. Garret Ridinger & Richard S. John & Michael McBride & Nicholas Scurich, 2016. "Attacker Deterrence and Perceived Risk in a Stackelberg Security Game," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(8), pages 1666-1681, August.
    5. Powell, Robert, 2007. "Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 527-541, August.
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